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Abstract
It has been argued that transaction trust is composed of party trust and control trust. In
this paper we study control trust: trust in an institution that has set up a control
mechanism. We present an account of control mechanisms using normative multiagent
systems. Control mechanisms consist of constitutive norms which define evidential
documents, and regulative norms which define violation conditions and sanctions. The
account is illustrated by an analysis of the Letter of Credit trade procedure.

1.

Introduction

Trust is an important concept in electronic commerce. When a transaction has to be
arranged over a long distance by individuals that do not know each other, and do not
share a social or cultural background, lack of trust is likely. We are interested in this
notion of transaction trust. Suppose individual a, the trustor, is about to engage in a
transaction with individual b, the trustee. The success of the transaction for a crucially
depends on the behavior of b, but a is not in a position to monitor or control b's behavior.
Because a is vulnerable to the actions of b, a's decision to engage in the transaction
depends on his level of trust ( Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995).
In general, transaction trust can be based on a personal relationship, on the social role that
the other party is playing in some institution, on personal past experiences, or on a
reputation, which is based on past experiences of other trusted parties. Such reasons for
trusting the other party are called party trust. In the absence of direct reasons for trusting
1
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the other party, a trustor may turn to institutions that enforce control mechanisms. Think
of an escrow service, or a quality standard maintained by an international standards body.
The mere presence of a control mechanism is not enough. The trustor must understand
how the mechanism works, and must have trust in the institution that enforces it. This is
called control trust. The general idea can be summarized as follows ( Tan and Thoen
2000, Tan and Thoen 2002).
Transaction Trust = Party Trust + Control Trust
Regarding party trust, a lot of research effort has gone into on-line reputation
mechanisms, and methods for learning people's trustworthiness on the basis of past
experiences, e.g. ( Macy and Skvoretz 1998, Castelfranchi and Tan 2000). Much less
attention has been paid to control trust. However, we believe that this factor is as
important as the other factors in predicting transaction trust.
In this paper we will have a look at the way an individual understands a control
mechanism, and how this affects the decision to trust another party. Thus we have the
following two research questions.
1. How can we model control trust?
2. How does control trust affect transaction trust?
The research method is to make a model of the relevant aspects of the individual's
decision making process, and use a logic to represent the model. In general such logical
models can be used for simulation and analysis, or can be implemented directly in an
intelligent trust management system. An example of the latter kind of model is found in
declarative policy languages for access control ( Blaze, Feigenbaum, and Lacy 1996). Our
model is intended for purposes of analysis and simulation.
The particular type of model we use in this paper is that of a normative multiagent system
(NMAS). Normative multiagent systems are
"sets of agents (human or artificial) whose interactions can fruitfully be regarded
as norm-governed; the norms prescribe how the agents ideally should and should
not behave. (...) Importantly, the norms allow for the possibility that actual
behavior may at times deviate from the ideal, i.e., that violations of obligations,
or of agents’ rights, may occur" ( Jones and Carmo 2002).
We will use the version of NMAS developed by Boella et al. (2004; 2005). In particular,
we apply the possibility of recursive modeling that is afforded by multiagent systems:
based on a profile of other agents, an agent can simulate several scenario's, and select an
appropriate decision on the basis of those simulations. A profile is nothing but a set of
expectations. This reflects the fact that we treat trust as an epistemic notion. So in our
account, the amount of trust is based on the information agents have about other agents.
Control mechanisms are modeled here by a collection of constitutive and regulative rules.
Constitutive rules define the institutional concepts. They are modeled here as generic
beliefs. Regulative rules define violation conditions and sanctions. Such rules are
enforced by an abstract entity, called a normative system. Crucially, trustor agents do not
only have a profile of the trustee, but also a profile of the normative system that enforces
the control mechanisms. The idea is depicted in Figure 1. Party trust is only based on the
expectations of the trustor about the trustee. These expectations can be based on
additional background information, such as personal acquaintance or shared cultural
values. In the figure, it is represented by the vertical interaction between trustor and
trustee. Control trust is more complex. It is based on expectations of the interaction
between trustor and trustee, given the interaction of trustee with a normative system.
2
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Figure 1: Recursive modeling of trustor, trustee and normative system
Obviously, the simulations we run are largely based on assumptions. Often these
assumption are derived from specific knowledge of the case. Technically, they are stored
in a model M. For example, model MLC contains specific assumptions about the Letter of
Credit procedure.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. To illustrate the approach we discuss the
Letter of Credit trade procedure in section 2. In section 3 we define normative multiagent
systems, as well as constitutive and regulative rules. In section 4 we analyze the Letter of
Credit procedure in a normative multiagent system.

2.

Letter of Credit

Consider the well known documentary credit procedure of a Letter of Credit (Bons 1997,
Lee 2000, Kartseva, Gordijn, and Tan 2004). Suppose we have a potential transaction
between a customer and a supplier, which is located in a remote and unfamiliar part of the
world. Hence there are no common conventions or trade procedures. In such
circumstances a lack of trust is warranted. The supplier does not want to ship the goods
without first receiving payment, but the customer does not want to pay before the goods
have been shipped. To solve this deadlock situation banks introduced the Letter of Credit
procedure (LC). A Letter of Credit is an agreement that the bank of the customer, called
the issuing bank, will arrange a credit to guarantee payment as soon as the supplier can
prove that the goods have been shipped. The supplier can prove this by presenting the
shipping documents, such as a Bill of Lading, to his own bank, the corresponding bank.
The shipping documents are issued by the carrier, as soon as the goods have in fact been
shipped. The corresponding bank transfers the shipping documents to the issuing bank,
which only delivers the shipping documents to the customer after payment. With the
shipping documents the customer can then reclaim the goods from the carrier.
A possible way of modeling the procedure is depicted in Figure 2, adapted from ( Lee
2000). It indicates the order in which documents must be exchanged, which provides
information about the dependencies among actions: which actions will occur only
provided some other actions have occurred. For example, the objective of step 4 is to let
the supplier know that a credit has been secured, and that he can safely start shipping the
goods. Similarly, the objective of the shipping documents, is to provide evidence that the
goods have been transferred.
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Figure 2: Interaction Diagram of the Letter of Credit Procedure
By means of the Letter of Credit procedure the original lack of trust between customer
and supplier is replaced by a professional banking relationship between the issuing bank
and the corresponding bank. The banks provide a service, a credit procedure, which is
paid for by a fee. The fee must cover the handling costs and the insurance costs against
the risk that the credit will not be redeemed. The professional banking relationship is
much more trustworthy than the original transaction relationship, for a number of reasons.
First, documentary credit procedures generally conform to the guidelines of the
International Chamber of Commerce. Moreover, shipping documents have an evidentiary
effect, guaranteed by the United Nations. Therefore, in case of a legal conflict, no party
can claim not to have known about this evidentiary effect.
Second, trading banks tend to have long term relationships. The success of these
relationships is dependent on their reputation. In case a customer has a dispute with a
bank over a Letter of Credit procedure, it might start a legal case, possibly damaging the
reputation of the bank.
Third, banks are regulated by their respective Central Banks. That means that, at least
locally, banks can act as an institution that enforces adherence to the rules.

3.

Normative Multiagent Systems

We present the basic idea of normative multiagent systems here. For a more technical
exposition, we refer to Boella and van der Torre (2004).
3.1

Beliefs and Goals

Each agent has a profile of the mental attitudes of other agents. A profile contains the
beliefs (information) and goals (internal motivations). External motivations, such as

4

Analyzing Control Trust in Normative Multiagent Systems

social norms or laws, can be represented in the form of obligations. Later we show how
obligations are reduced to a combination of beliefs and goals.
Mental attitudes are represented in a logical language, as sets of conditionals or
production rules. This expresses the fact that mental attitudes are context dependent (
Hansson 1969), and that their application is conditional on certain constraints. So each
attitude Bel, Goal, is represented by a set of rules of the form A → B, where both A and B
are formulas, composed of facts by means of logical operators ∧ (and), ∨ (or), ¬ (not) and
the constant T (always true). Here A represents the conditions under which the facts
represented by B may be inferred by the agent. Moreover, B may contain special decision
variables, actions, whicht will alter that state of the world. For simplicity, both facts and
decision variables are represented by Boolean variables, being either true or false. The
decision making process of an agent is represented by a forward reasoning loop, which
runs roughly as follows.
The agent receives input from observation, represented as a set of facts S. Alternatively,
the agent may start with a set of initial goals, represented by a set of decision variables S.
Now the agent tries to match each rule A → B against S. If A is contained in S, and the
facts of B do not contradict a fact in S, the rule is applicable. However, there may be
several rules applicable to S, from the same and from different mental attitudes, each with
a different possible outcome. Using a priority order, the agent selects one rule  this is
called conflict resolution  and applies it: the result B is now added to S. This process
continues, until a stable set of facts is reached, to which no further additions can be made.
Such a stable set, an extension, represents one of the possible outcomes of the decision
making. The decision making behavior of an agent crucially depends on the way conflicts
among the mental attitudes are resolved. Different priority orders may lead to different
extensions, which represent sets of goals and hence lead to different behavior. For
example, a selfish agent will prefer goals to social obligations; a social agent will let
obligations take priority.
Example 1. Buying and Budget Suppose an agent is a compulsive collector. Whenever
it finds a rare toy, it wants to buy it. Because of a tight budget, the agent made up its mind
not to buy any more toys. Now suppose the agent finds another rare toy. What will
happen?
Belief: rare_toy
Goal 1: rare_toy → buy_toy
Goal 2: ¬ buy_toy
What happens depends on the relative strength of the agent's urge to buy the car (goal 1)
and its resolution not to (goal 2). These relative strengths can be expressed by a priority
ordering on rules. In general, belief rules outrank all other goal rules; otherwise the agent
would suffer from wishful thinking. If the second goal rule would outrank the first goal
rule, the agent will refrain from buying. Otherwise, it will buy despite its resolutions.
Priority: Belief > Goal 1 > Goal 2
Outcome: { rare_toy , buy_toy}
The example demonstrates that an agent considers different possible goals. Roughly,
there are two kinds of goals. Achievement goals are satisfied once some state of affairs
has been realized. For example, to buy an object. Maintenance goals on the other hand,
are only satisfied for as long as some state of affairs continues to hold, for example the
goal to stay within budget.
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3.2. Norms and Obligations
Beliefs and goals are mental attitudes of individual agents. How about social norms?
General norms produce obligations for each agent that has accepted the norm. We
propose a reduction of obligations to goals of the normative system, where the normative
system itself is seen as a separate agent. This may be summarized by the slogan "Your
wish is my command". The reduction makes use of a violation predicate ( Anderson
1958). Violation detection is separated from sanctioning. Sanctioning concerns the
decision to sanction an agent in case a violation has been detected, and what sanction is
most appropriate. To make sure that normative systems do not act arbitrarily, a number of
conditions must be observed ( Boella and van der Torre 2004).
Definition 1 (Regulative Norm) Agent a is obliged to bring about x in circumstances C,
under sanction s, with respect to a normative system n in a given model M, written as M
|= Obla,n(x, s | C), if and only if the following conditions hold.
1. If agent n believes that C, then it has as a goal that x should be brought about.
Goal of n: C → x
2. If agent n believes that C and ¬x is the case, then it has the goal
i.e., to detect ¬x as a violation by agent a.

Viol(¬x, a),

Goal of n: C ∧ ¬x → Viol(¬x, a)
3. Agent n has as a goal that there are no violations. This is to prevent arbitrary
violation detection.
Goal of n: ¬Viol(¬x, a)
4. If agent n believes C and detects Viol(a,¬x), then it has the goal to sanction agent
a.
Goal of n: C ∧ Viol(¬x, a) → s
5. By itself, agent n does not have a goal to sanction. This is to prevent arbitrary
sanctioning.
Goal of n: ¬s
6. Agent a has the goal ¬s. Without this condition, sanction s would not deter agent
a from violating the obligation.
Goal of a: ¬s
To illustrate the definitions, we will use an example of some aspects of the Letter of
Credit procedure. A complete analysis follows in section 4.
Example 2. Evidentiary documents
The model MLC is constructed as follows. We use Boolean variables `LC',
`shipping_docs', `transfer_goods', `fraud', and `law_suit' to represent the facts of
operating in the context of a Letter of Credit procedure, presenting the shipping
documents, having transferred the goods from the custody of the supplier to the carrier,
committing fraud, and starting a law suit, respectively. Variable a ranges over the
relevant agents: customer (c), issuing bank (ib), corresponding bank (cb), supplier (s) and
carrier (ca). We use un to denote the United nations: the institution that defines the
meaning of shipping documents. We use n to denote the normative agent that is able to
enforce a norm. Once a letter of Credit procedure has been established, this role is usually
taken by the issuing bank. Because the issuing bank has long term trading relationships
with many parties involved, it can come up with a credible sanction for each violation. In
6
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the example, let us suppose that the sanction will be a lengthy law suit, with possible
additional repercussions for reputation. We have an obligation to respect the meaning of
the shipping documents, against a penalty of a lengthy law suit.
MLC |= Obla,n(¬fraud, law_suit | LC ), if and only if:
1. Goal of n: LC → ¬fraud
2. Goal of n: LC ∧ fraud →Viol(fraud, a)
3. Goal of n: ¬Viol(fraud, a)
4. Goal of n: LC ∧ Viol(fraud, a) → law_suit
5. Goal of n: ¬ law_suit
6. Goal of a: ¬ law_suit
Without the obligation, committing fraud would be desirable. For example, for a carrier it
is profitable to issue fake shipping documents. Moreover, everybody knows we are
operating in the context of a Letter of Credit procedure.
7. Goal of a: shipping docs ∧ ¬ transfer_goods
8. Belief of a, n: LC
3.3

Constitutive Norms

A normative system defines when institutional facts hold by constitutive norms. In
general, there are two kinds of norms. Constitutive norms generate or constitute the
institutional context, by means of establishing institutional facts (Searle 1995). For
example, the rules of chess constitute the game by defining legal moves and positions.
Regulative norms, by contrast, restrict the behavior of agents through obligations and
enforcement mechanisms.
A constitutive norm applies only under certain circumstances and is intimately linked to
an institution. This institution can be a (legal) person or an abstract entity such as a
community of users. Whether a rule applies depends on the jurisdiction of the institution.
Thus constitutive rules are of the form "x counts as y under circumstances C in institution
i". Several logical representations of counts-as rules have been studied, e.g., ( Jones and
Sergot 1996). Counts-as rules associate one type of event or fact with another type of
event or fact.
In our NMAS model constitutive norms are modeled as belief rules of the institution.
Moreover, having the rule is imperative for all agents that fall under the jurisdiction of the
institution.
Definition 2 (Constitutive norm) Event or fact x counts as event or fact y under
circumstances C, to all agents a that fall under the jurisdiction of i in a given model M,
written M |= Counts_asa,i(x, y | C), if and only if:
1. Belief of a,i: C ∧ x → y
2. If x results from an action, the agent executing the action must play a role in
institution i.
There is one relevant constitutive rule in our example.
7
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|=
Counts_asa,un((shipping
docs∧ ¬transfer_goods),fraud|LC),
MLC
i.e., Belief of un,a: LC ∧ shipping_docs ∧ ¬transfer_goods → fraud

3.4

Recursive Modeling

Now we apply recursive modeling. Suppose agent a operates in the context of a Letter of
Credit procedure, has a goal to cheat, and a goal to avoid law suits. So we get an initial
extension of the form {LC, fraud, ¬ law_suit}. Because the consequences of these
potential goals are to a large part controlled by the other party, agent a will try and predict
the decisions of agent n. A set of rules to predict another agent's decisions is called a
profile. Crucially, profiles contain rules that are affected by the actions of the agent itself.
That is why this process is called recursive modeling. However, for most applications no
infinite recursion is needed; recursive models up to three levels of embedding are usually
quite sufficient. Here we only need one level of embedding.
First a compares rule 2 with rule 3. Which of these will get priority depends on a's
profile of n. Lets assume that a believes that rule 2 outranks 3. That will produce an
extension {LC, fraud, Viol(fraud, a), ¬ law_suit}. Second, a compares rule 4 and 5. If a
expects n not to sanction, for example because of prohibitive costs of lawyers, a will form
the goal to cheat. But if a expects n to act on detected fraud, this will produce an
extension { LC, fraud, Viol(fraud, a), law_suit, ¬ law_suit }, which contains a
contradiction. This conflict must be resolved by a's own priority order. In case the penalty
outweighs the expected profits, the agent will not form a goal to commit fraud: { LC, ¬
law_suit }.
The example shows that an obligation only works when two conditions are met. First, the
sanction must outweigh the benefits of a violation.
(Goal of a: ¬ law_suit) > (Goal of a: fraud)
Second, the expected relative priorities of being detected and sanctioned, must be
sufficiently high.
Profile of a:
Goal of n: LC ∧ fraud → Viol(fraud, a) > Goal of n: ¬Viol(fraud,a)
Goal of n: LC ∧Viol(fraud, a) → law_suit > Goal of n: ¬law_suit
Violation detection and sanctioning can be delegated to specific agents, such as a police
force. In the Letter of Credit case, violation detection is to a large extend the
responsibility of the victims. For example, when a carrier has not transferred the goods to
the customer, the customer can take the shipping documents, and file a complaint, i.e.,
notify the normative system of the violation.

4.

Letter of Credit in NMAS

In this section we remodel the Letter of Credit procedure in normative multiagent
systems, to indicate how control trust plays a role in transaction trust.
We will model two sets of circumstances: one in which no control mechanism is in place,
and one in which a Letter of Credit procedure has been established.
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4.1

Without Letter of Credit

We have the following scenario. Supplier s must decide to trust customer c in a
transaction that consists of two actions: payment from c to s, and shipment from s to c,
where price and details of delivery have been previously agreed. The sales contract would
consist of two obligations:
Obl c,n(payment, in_debt | shipping)
Obl s,n(shipping, in_debt | payment)
However, initially there is no credible normative system n that could enforce this
contract. Parties are left to enforce their own contract, i.e. use external motivations like
threats. But although parties can easily detect violations, they do not have the power to
make a credible threat.
Without documentary credits, there are still reasons for an agent to honor the contract.
First, an agent could have the internal motivation that being in debt is morally wrong, and
therefore undesirable. If this disposition were known, for example through shared cultural
values, the agent can be trusted. Second, when the trade relationship is supposed to last
for a longer period, a credible threat would be to end the trade relationship and ruin
possible future transactions. In both cases adding such information would beg the
question.
So, in the absence of any further information, in the profile of the supplier, the customer
has no incentive to pay after delivery. Similarly, the customer will expect the supplier not
to deliver the goods after payment.
Profile of s:
(Goal of c: ¬ payment) > (Goal of c: ¬ in_debt)
Profile of c:
(Goal of s: ¬ shipping) > (Goal of s: ¬ in_debt)

4.2

With Letter of Credit

What we need is a mutual obligation in which non-compliance of one, irrevocably leads
to failure for the other. Such a direct exchange of goods for money is only possible, when
parties are physically present, and in possession of the valuables.
Oblc,n(payment, ¬shipping | shipping )
Obls,n(shipping, ¬payment | payment).
Because a simultaneous exchange is not possible in international trade, the mutual
obligation must depend on evidentiary documents.
Oblc,n(payment, ¬shipping | evidence of shipping )
Obls,n(shipping, ¬payment | evidence of credit).
Such documents can be created through a Letter of Credit procedure. The rules of the
procedure (figure 2) are constituted by the international trading conventions, encoded by
the United Nations. The issuing bank acts as a normative system n to enforce adherence
to these procedures. The issuing bank is a good candidate for enforcing the rules. First, its
sanctions are credible. It is in a position to damage the other parties, for example by
starting a law suit. Starting a lawsuit would not have been possible for the supplier for
example, because it would involve a foreign legal system. Second, violation detection is
relatively easy. Because of the evidentiary documents, typically the victim of fraud will
be able to prove that a violation occurred.
9
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So we must show that because of the dependencies specified in the constitutive rules of
the Letter of Credit procedure, and the regulative enforcement by the issuing bank, the
link between `evidence of shipping' and actual shipping, and the link between `evidence
of credit' and actual payment, is strong enough to let both parties engage in the
transaction (Figure 2).
In other words, we must show that, in the profile of the supplier,
1. the corresponding bank has an incentive to pay, upon receiving the shipping
documents (step 7-8), and consequently
2. the carrier will have an incentive to deliver the shipping documents, in return for
the goods (step 4-6).
Similarly, we must show that, in the profile of the customer,
1. the carrier has an incentive to transport the goods and deliver them to the
customer, in return for the shipping documents (step 14-15), and hence
2. the corresponding bank and the issuing bank have incentives to transfer the
shipping documents from the supplier to the customer, in return for their
respective payments (steps 9-10,12-13).
For lack of space, we can only sketch two of these requirements. The other steps are
analogous.
Step 7-8 According to the supplier, why should the corresponding bank pay? First, not
paying would count as violation for the corresponding bank at this stage of the Letter of
Credit procedure. It would risk a law suit. Second, it does not have much reason to
withhold payment, since earlier it received credit from the issuing bank (step 3). And
third, it needs the shipping documents, in order to get payment (step 9-10). Because the
supplier will not hand over the shipping documents, there is a direct motivation for
complying. Only the first suggestion is worked out in detail. It is a special case of
example 2.
Profile of s:
Oblcb,ib(payment, law_suit) | LC ∧ shipping_docs )
As we analyzed, this requires the following conditions:
Profile of s:
(Goal of cb: ¬ transfer_goods) < (Goal of cb: ¬law_suit))
(Goal of ib: LC ∧ shipping_docs ∧ ¬ payment → Viol(fraud, cb))
> (Goal of ib: ¬Viol(fraud, cb))
(Goal of ib: LC ∧ Viol(fraud, cb) → law_suit)
> (Goal of ib: ¬ law_suit)
Step 14-15 Again, this is a special case of example 2. note that the carrier must already
be in possession of the goods; otherwise the arrival notification (step 11) must have been
false. When the goods are not handed over, the customer has a right to redress: he could
notify the issuing bank (ib) that the carrier violated the Letter of Credit procedure. In that
case, the carrier risks a law suit.
Profile of c:
Oblca,ib(transfer_goods, law_suit |LC ∧ shipping_docs∧arrival_notif)
As indicated, this will only work in case the following conditions are met.
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Analyzing Control Trust in Normative Multiagent Systems

Profile of c:
Goal of ca: ¬ transfer_goods) < (Goal of ca: ¬ law_suit)
(Goal of ib: LC ∧ shipping_docs ∧ arrival_notif ∧
¬goods →
Viol(fraud,ca)) > (Goal of ib: ¬Viol(fraud, ca))
(Goal of ib: LC ∧Viol(fraud, ca) → law_suit)
> (Goal of ib: ¬law_suit)
Note that customer c is in a position to assess these conditions, at least for ib. Typically,
such expectations are based on aspects of party trust (personal experience, role,
reputation).

5.

Conclusions

In this paper we studied transaction trust and its components party trust and control trust.
Where party trust is based on expectations of parties about each other, control trust also
involves expectations of parties about a normative system, and the way the other party
will react to that normative system.
The research questions can now be answered as follows.
1. Control trust is generated by the existence of a control mechanism, and an
institution that is perceived to be actively enforcing it. Control mechanisms may
contain both evidentiary documents and obligations. Evidentiary documents can
be accounted for by constitutive norms. Obligations can be reduced to a system
of beliefs and goals of the normative system and the subject, according to the
principle "Your wish is my command'. Our case study of the Letter of Credit
procedure, showed that it makes sense to model control mechanisms as a
combination of constitutive norms, that define institutional facts, and regulative
norms, that enforce compliance to obligations through violation detection and
sanctioning.
2. Control trust will affect transaction trust by the fact that, according the trustor's
profile, the trustee will let its decisions depend on the way a normative system is
enforcing a control mechanism. That means that, according the trustor's profile,
(1) the normative system must be willing and able to detect and sanction possible
violations, and (2) the trustee must prefer avoiding a sanction to a violation. In
our case study, we contrasted a situation without a Letter of Credit, in which the
trustor would be most likely not to trust the trustee, with a situation in which a
Letter of Credit procedure is established. In that case, the trustor is indeed likely
to trust the trustee, provided conditions (1) and (2) are met.
Trust aspects of international trade procedures can be generalized to electronic
commerce. Like international trade, electronic commerce often takes place between
parties that are separated in time and space, do not know each other, and do not share a
cultural background. Based on our initial analysis, we suggest the following steps for
designing a control mechanism:
1. Standards for evidentiary documents (constitutive norms) must be known and
respected globally.
2. Use of a standard must be enforced locally through regulative norms, by a
normative system that has the institutional power to apply credible sanctions.
3. Start with a mutual obligation, in which the sanction for both parties is simply
non-compliance of the other party.
11
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4. Set up a causal chain such that evidence of compliance can replace compliance
itself, as an incentive for the other party to engage in a transaction.
In further research we will investigate the mutual obligations that occur in a simultaneous
exchange. These can be analyzed as a mutual threat or promise: I will comply only if you
comply. It appears the structure of mutual threats or promises is simpler than that of the
obligations analyzed in definition 1.

References
Anderson, A. (1958). A reduction of deontic logic to alethic modal logic. Mind, 67:100103.
Blaze, M., J. Feigenbaum, and J. Lacy. (1996). Decentralized trust management. In IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE, pages 164-173.
Boella, G. and L. van der Torre. (2004). Regulative and constitutive norms in normative
multiagent systems. In Procs. of 9th International Conference on the Principles
of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, pages 255-265.
Boella, G., J. Hulstijn, and L. van der Torre. (2005). Virtual organizations as normative
multiagent systems. In Proceedings of the 38th Annual Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'05), volume 7, page 192c.
Bons, R. W. H. (1997). Designing Trustworthy Trade Procedures for open Electronic
Commerce. Ph.D. thesis, University of Rotterdam. Castelfranchi, C. and Y. Tan,
editors. (2000). Trust and Deception in Virtual Societies. Kluwer.
Hansson, B. (1969). An analysis of some deontic logics. Nôus, 3:373-398.
Jones, A. and J. Carmo. (2002). Deontic logic and contrary-to-duties. In D. Gabbay,
editor, Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Kluwer, pages 203–-279.
Jones, A. and M. Sergot. (1996). A formal characterisation of institutionalised power.
Journal of the Interest Group in Pure and Applied Logic, 3:427-443.
Kartseva, V., J. Gordijn, and Y.-H. Tan. (2004). Analysing preventative and detective
control mechanisms in international trade using value modelling. In Proceedings
of the Sixth International Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC'04), pages
51-18. ACM Press.
Lee, R. M. (2000). Documentary Petri Nets: A modeling representation ffor electronic
trade procedures. In W. van der Aalst, editor, Business Proces Management,
LNCS 1806. Springer Verlag, pages 359-375.
Macy, M. W. and J. Skvoretz. (1998). The evolution of trust and cooperation between
strangers: A computational model. American Sociological Review, 63:638-660.
Mayer, R., J. Davis, and F. Schoorman. (1995). An integrative model of organizational
trust. Academy of Management Review, 20(3):709-734.
Searle, J. (1995). The Construction of Social Reality. The Free Press, New York.
Tan, Y.-H. and W. Thoen. (2000). An outline of a trust model for electronic commerce.
Applied Artificial Intelligence, 14(8):849-862.
Tan, Y.-H. and W. Thoen. (2002). Formal aspects of a generic model of trust for
electronic commerce. Decision Support Systems, 33(3):233 - 246.
United Nations. (1980). United nations convention on international multimodal transport
of goods. Technical report, UNCITRAL (Geneva, 24 May 1980)
12

